Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Future of Federal Housing Finance Policy: A Study of Regulatory Privilege
This report analyzes the implications of the conservatorship and potential reform of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, focusing on regulatory privilege and its impact on competition and the U.S. mortgage market.
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| Quick Facts | |
|---|---|
| Report location: | source |
| Language: | English |
| Publisher: | CATO Institute |
| Authors: | David Reiss |
| Geographic focus: | United States |
Methods
The research method involved employing regulatory theory to construct a framework for analyzing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's roles in the mortgage market, their regulatory privileges, and the implications for reform.
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Key Insights
The conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac presents an opportunity to reform these government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Their government-mandated mission to support the U.S. mortgage market conflicts with their profit-driven nature. Regulatory theory suggests their public/private structure allows them to obtain economic rents at taxpayer expense, distorting the market. The report proposes privatization, arguing that their public functions should be assumed by government actors, creating a level playing field in the financial sector.
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Additional Viewpoints
Categories: English publication language | United States geographic scope | conservatorship | economic rents | financial sector | market distortion | mortgage market | privatization | public functions | reform framework | regulatory privilege | taxpayer expense